In talking about a ‘European Public Sphere’, are we asking how to build such a thing, or to make it just work better?  In this newsletter (no. 3, May 2007: 7-9), the Vice-President of the European Commission – Margot Wallström – asked the former question, before then suggesting an answer based on the European Commission’s European Communication Policy. But before we think about her answer, let us begin by considering whether we do indeed lack a ‘European Public Sphere’ (EPS)?

Well, it depends on how you define this concept. As Wallström rightly says in her intervention, any such sphere would far exceed the ‘capacity of the European Commission itself – or indeed of any single institution’. But, does it exceed the European Union? To begin, a first clue can be found in what she presents as the bricks and mortar of a ‘European Public Sphere’, which includes: the media, schools, public forums, and the internet. In other words, a EPS rests on developing channels of communication facilitating interaction between citizens in which ‘European’ issues are discussed. These debates – to include involvement from European decision-makers, as well as ‘local politicians, environmental activists, consumer representatives, trade unionists and business people’ – contesting the shape of EU policy will be monitored by ‘opinion polls and focus group discussions…[and thus] feed directly into the process of formulating EU policies’, to quote Wallström.

The ‘EPS’ as a Network

Whilst one might argue over the details of how best to construct such communicative channels, what becomes apparent is the network character of the polity Wallström presents. Though these interactions are unlikely to be even or equal, the network metaphor is useful if understood in the sense used by Keck and Sikkink, evoking a political space ‘in which differently situated actors negotiate – formally or informally – the social, cultural, and political meanings of their joint enterprise’.

Understood thus, a EPS does already exist. It can be found at the intersection of the countless number of smaller networks focused on ‘Europe’. With diverse agendas these networks range from academic forums (such as CINEFOGO) to advocacy coalitions (including interest- and issue-groups).  In some cases, these networks exist only at the ‘European’ level in order to facilitate the sharing of resources towards activity at the level of the individual nation-states (as often happens in advocacy coalitions). However, in all cases, these networks are reliant upon a particular concept of ‘Europe’ to facilitate their field of interaction. Furthermore, by building interaction upon a ‘European’ identity, these entities help substantiate that identity. This phenomenon can be observed even in those networks which profess an ‘anti-European’ agenda (such as nationalists) but which rely upon cross-European collaboration. Rather than debating does a ‘European Public Sphere’ exist, then, what is actually taking place right now is a contest over the characteristics of that sphere.

Contesting the shape of ‘Europe’

Critical to the characteristics of this emergent phenomenon is the question of who can be part of the debate, to which Wallström’s call for ‘active citizens’ is so very pertinent. The operation of any network is dependent upon who may interact. But, who is this ‘who’?

As a first point, one might look to the ballot box. The question of ‘who’ is answered there by the territorial boundaries of the European Union and those institutional arrangements determining who is a ‘citizen’ of the EU. If the EPS exists to only encourage debates that provoke individuals to turn-out and vote for their preferred candidate to the European Parliament, then this would be the end of the discussion.

However, the network of interactions embodying the EPS cannot be limited to such an insitutional arrangement alone, as Wallström notes. Those utilizing and substantiating a ‘European’ field of interaction have a more complex view of decision-making at the European-level. This is evident in the role of lobbyists representing a myriad of different interest- and issue-based demands to both the European Commission, EU parliamentarians, and the individual member-states. Wallström’s reference to opinion polls and focus groups goes some way to building a further input through which influence may be exerted.

Yet, this all suggests a view of the EPS as a funnel through which various influences feed into the final policy process. The problem here is that it ignores the nature of policy-formation as an ongoing process that is as much reliant upon the aftermath of implementation as it is upon the initial demands. Policy formation is not a linear flow process but includes an inherent feedback mechanism, however imperfect, where policy decisions are both facilitated and constrained by ‘political realities’. In addition, the fragmented character of the EPS as the intersection of multiple smaller networks mentioned above, further complicates the formation of policy decisions.

‘Political realities’

These ‘political realities’ add a far higher degree of complexity to understanding the EPS, because one is required to think beyond the European Union if we are to understand the network of interactions contesting the shape of the ‘European’ project. Certainly there is a supra-EU identity to many of those networks actively attempting to influence European Commission policy. However, this is not a simple matter of acknowledging all the inputs, but also the interactive context in which policies are implemented.

Implementation is part of the network through which ‘European’ governance is performed, with the various interactions (rejection/compliance) involved arguably a part of the EPS because they interpellate individuals within the struggle to shape ‘Europe’. It is common for policies to have quite unexpected consequences, contingent as much upon implementation as initial formation. This is no less true with the performance of European governance.

The EPS as a Governance Network

However, does this not distract focus from the ‘public’ character of the EPS and so obfuscate Wallström’s focus on European citizenship? Well, no, because it points back to the question of ‘active citizens’ and how, in the logic described above, individuals already have a limited role within European governance. EU citizens are part of the ‘political reality’ both facilitating and constraining governance at the European-level, because they form the canvas onto which implementation is enacted. As said, this is limited, as refusal to follow certain policies might lead to certain punitive consequences or constrained life opportunities. However, refusal does occur and where it does it has political potency. This is not to advocate such refusal, but to acknowledge that it – together with less extreme reactions – constitute a contestatory field shaping the reality of European governance. If we want ‘active citizens’, then the ingredients Wallström prescribes will suffice only if they help individuals to realise their already existing role within the European project. The reason I say ‘if we want’ is, of course, because having ‘active citizens’ does require a certain acceptance of political disagreement. Deciding what constitutes an acceptable level of disagreement remains a recurring debate for all political systems, and is certainly no less relevant at the European level.

‘Europe’ as an open-ended question

The difficulty for the European project is whether or not ‘active citizens’ are compatible with a centralised form of decision-making in which distinct disagreement is inevitable. History suggests that disagreement is most dangerous when the individuals involved lack self-reflexivity and become too closely tied to a narrow point of view, in denial of their own fallibility. If we are to maintain the European project and engage all stakeholders – whether EU citizens or not – then we need to find ways to foster the right conditions for self-reflexive disagreement. The network metaphor is useful here if it can avoid the finality suggested by a traditional institutionalist approach, because it points to the constitutive interactions rather than a fixed structure of governance.

At whatever level, governance can rarely be understood through formal relations alone, but relies on a series of informal interactions in which who/what constitutes an ‘actor’ is limited but never static. Understood as a network, the formal aspects of governance are relations that have become sedimented into a particular structure, whereas the informal aspects express a more fluid character. Thus, the European Commission represents a particular point of sedimentation within the wider network of European governance that includes many less formal aspects. The way to foster ‘active citizens’, therefore, must be to communicate this lack of fixity within the European project, so that individuals may realise their own role within the constantly exciting struggle to shape European governance. The question of what is ‘Europe’ should remain open.

Michael Strange is project researcher for ‘Complex Decision-Making at the Global Level: the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body as a Transnational Governance Network’.

Article title based on Keck, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists beyond borders – advocacy networks in international politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p.3.